Without Hezbollah’s disarmament there is no peace

Just days after the United States announced its Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Iran, another diplomatic initiative has emerged—this time a framework agreement between Israel and Lebanon. At first glance, both developments appear to signal progress towards peace. The real question is whether either agreement will actually change anything on the ground.

A recent article by Khaled Abu Toameh at the Gatestone Institute argues that the Lebanon framework is only likely to succeed if one fundamental condition is met: Hezbollah must be disarmed. Without that, any agreement risks becoming little more than another piece of paper.

That is easier said than done.

Hezbollah has already rejected the agreement outright, describing it as illegitimate and insisting that it will continue to operate as an armed “resistance” movement. Its leaders have made it clear they have no intention of surrendering their weapons, despite years of UN resolutions demanding exactly that. (New York Post⁠)

The new framework reportedly envisages the Lebanese Armed Forces gradually taking control of southern Lebanon while Hezbollah is dismantled and disarmed, allowing Israel eventually to withdraw from occupied security zones. Israel has welcomed the agreement as an opportunity to weaken Iran’s influence and restore Lebanese sovereignty. (New York Post⁠)

The problem is that Lebanon has been here before.

For decades the Lebanese government has officially claimed sovereignty over the whole country, yet Hezbollah has continued to operate as a heavily armed state within a state. Numerous ceasefires, UN resolutions and diplomatic agreements have all promised that Hezbollah would be disarmed. None has achieved that objective.

If the Lebanese government cannot—or will not—enforce its own authority, then the framework risks joining a long list of well-intentioned agreements that ultimately changed very little.

Then there is the central role of Iran. Hezbollah is not simply a Lebanese political party; it is Iran’s most important regional proxy. As long as Tehran continues to finance, arm and direct Hezbollah, genuine Lebanese sovereignty remains difficult to achieve.

That raises an obvious question about the earlier U.S.–Iran Memorandum of Understanding. If Iran has not abandoned its regional ambitions, and Hezbollah refuses to disarm, then what practical value does the MOU really have?

Diplomatic agreements are easy to sign.

Enforcing them against determined armed organisations backed by foreign powers is something entirely different.

History suggests that peace is achieved not by signatures on documents but by changing realities on the ground. Until Hezbollah no longer possesses an independent military capability, Israel is unlikely to believe its northern border is secure, and many Lebanese citizens will continue to live under the shadow of a force that answers ultimately to Tehran rather than Beirut.

The framework agreement is therefore a welcome aspiration. Whether it becomes a genuine peace agreement or simply another chapter in the long history of failed Middle East diplomacy will depend almost entirely on whether Hezbollah is actually disarmed.

That is the test.

For a more detailed analysis, I recommend reading Khaled Abu Toameh’s original article at the Gatestone Institute.