The Anti-Israel Industry

If you were watching events unfold after Hamas' barbaric massacre of 1,200 Israelis on October 7, 2023, you could be forgiven for believing that millions of ordinary citizens around the Western world simultaneously experienced a spontaneous moral awakening.

Within days, city streets from London to Sydney, New York to Paris were awash with Palestinian flags, professionally printed banners, coordinated chants and well-organised marches. Universities erected encampments. Activists seemed to appear everywhere at once. The media described these demonstrations as "grassroots" expressions of public outrage at Israel's military response in Gaza.

There was just one problem with that narrative.

Grassroots movements don't normally emerge simultaneously across dozens of countries, with sophisticated logistics, legal support, media operations, fundraising infrastructure and professional organisers already in place.

A recent 129-page report by NGO Monitor examining 40 major post-October 7 protest campaigns in the United Kingdom lifts the curtain on what was really happening. Far from being spontaneous public demonstrations, the report describes a highly coordinated network of NGOs, activist organisations, foreign funding channels and advocacy groups that have been working together to mobilise anti-Israel campaigns. It found that around 80% of the UK's major anti-Israel protest activity involved NGO infrastructure and professional organisers.

This should surprise nobody.

Mass protest movements don't organise themselves. Someone books the venues. Someone prints the placards. Someone obtains permits, coordinates speakers, arranges transport, runs social media campaigns and pays the bills.

The NGO Monitor report identifies an extensive ecosystem of organisations that were able to rapidly mobilise after October 7 because they already existed. The massacre itself was simply the catalyst that activated an established activist infrastructure that had been campaigning against Israel for years.

The timing is perhaps the most revealing aspect of all.

Many demonstrations took place almost immediately after October 7, before Israel had even begun its major military operations in Gaza. The protests were not, therefore, solely a reaction to civilian casualties resulting from the war. In many cases, they began while Israel was still counting its dead and identifying the victims of the largest massacre of Jews since the Holocaust.

That should have prompted journalists to ask an obvious question: what exactly were these people protesting?

The answer increasingly appears to be that the protests were never primarily about humanitarian concerns. If they were, one might reasonably have expected equal outrage at Hamas' atrocities, condemnation of hostage-taking, or calls for Hamas' surrender. Instead, the overwhelming focus became the delegitimisation of Israel itself.

Criticism of Israeli government policy is perfectly legitimate. In a democracy, no government should be beyond criticism. Israel is no exception.

But when demonstrations routinely feature slogans calling for the elimination of the world's only Jewish state, when Jewish students are intimidated on university campuses, when synagogues require unprecedented security, and when protesters are unable or unwilling to condemn Hamas' barbarism, it becomes increasingly difficult to argue that this is merely a debate about foreign policy.

The line between anti-Israel activism and antisemitism has become disturbingly blurred.

What the NGO Monitor report demonstrates is that much of the post-October 7 protest movement was neither organic nor spontaneous. It was organised, funded and coordinated through networks that have spent years building the infrastructure necessary to shape public opinion and political discourse. This does not mean that every protester was aware of that infrastructure or shared its more extreme objectives. Many undoubtedly joined because they were genuinely concerned about civilian suffering in Gaza.

But they became, knowingly or otherwise, participants in a much larger political campaign.

The Western media bears responsibility here. By presenting these demonstrations as spontaneous expressions of public sentiment, it created the impression that public opinion had overwhelmingly turned against Israel virtually overnight. That perception itself became a powerful political weapon, influencing governments, institutions and corporations.

Public opinion matters in democracies. Manufactured public opinion matters even more.

The lesson is simple. Whenever we are told that thousands of people have suddenly and spontaneously appeared in our streets demanding political change, we should ask a few simple questions.

Who organised it?

Who funded it?

Who benefits from it?

The answers are often considerably more interesting than the slogans being shouted through the megaphones.

Sovereignty Under Siege

Over the past fifty years we have witnessed the steady rise of transnational organisations. Many were established with worthy and limited purposes—to encourage cooperation between nations, promote human rights, coordinate responses to disease outbreaks or prosecute the most heinous international crimes.

Few people objected.

After all, who could oppose human rights, international cooperation or justice for genocide and war crimes?

Yet somewhere along the way these organisations began to evolve. They are no longer merely forums where sovereign nations cooperate. Increasingly, they behave as if they are supranational governments—unelected bodies that believe they possess the moral and legal authority to sit in judgement of sovereign states.

The United Nations and its ever-expanding alphabet soup of agencies have become notorious for this. The Human Rights Council regularly condemns democratic nations while often giving authoritarian regimes a free pass. The World Health Organisation, originally created to coordinate international health efforts, sought unprecedented powers during the COVID era that would have significantly expanded its influence over domestic health policy.

But perhaps the most troubling example is the International Criminal Court.

The ICC was established under the Rome Statute in 2002 to prosecute individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity when national courts are unwilling or unable to do so. Its jurisdiction was intended to be limited and carefully defined.

Many democratic nations chose not to join. The United States, Israel, China, India and others decided that surrendering aspects of their judicial sovereignty to an international body was not in their national interests.

That should have been the end of the matter.

If a country chooses not to join an international organisation, surely that organisation has no authority over it. That is how treaties and sovereignty have traditionally worked.

Yet the ICC has increasingly behaved as though its jurisdiction extends wherever it believes moral authority exists. Its actions regarding Israel have become the most obvious example of this trend. Israel is not a member of the ICC and possesses an internationally respected and independent judicial system capable of investigating alleged misconduct by its own citizens and military personnel.

Supporters of the ICC argue that it may exercise jurisdiction where alleged crimes occur within territories that have accepted ICC jurisdiction. Critics argue that this interpretation effectively allows the Court to extend its reach to nationals of countries that never consented to its authority, thereby undermining the very principles upon which the Rome Statute was established.

Whichever side one takes on the legal arguments, the practical effect is unmistakable. Unelected international officials now claim the power to investigate, issue arrest warrants and make legal findings against leaders and citizens of sovereign nations that never agreed to be bound by them.

And it doesn't stop with member states.

Today, any nation can find itself condemned by international bureaucracies and so-called international legal mechanisms. These organisations issue reports, findings and recommendations which are then amplified by activist groups, sympathetic governments and much of the international media as though they are binding legal judgements.

The result is a gradual but profound shift in the balance of power.

Sovereign nations are increasingly expected to justify their domestic laws, military actions, health policies and social policies before international committees that are accountable to no electorate whatsoever.

Who elected the officials of the Human Rights Council?

Who elected the bureaucrats of the WHO?

Who elected the judges of the ICC?

The citizens of Australia certainly did not. Nor did the citizens of Israel, the United States or many other democratic nations whose governments now find themselves subject to international scrutiny and condemnation.

There is another problem that receives far too little attention. International organisations are almost impossible to remove once they acquire power. National governments can be voted out of office. Politicians can be dismissed by the electorate.

International bureaucracies enjoy no such democratic accountability.

They expand their mandates incrementally, redefine their missions and acquire ever greater influence without a single vote being cast by the people affected by their decisions.

This is why sovereignty matters.

Sovereignty is not some outdated nineteenth-century concept. It is the mechanism by which citizens govern themselves through democratic institutions. When power is transferred from elected governments to transnational organisations, democratic accountability is diminished.

International cooperation is both desirable and necessary. Nations should cooperate on trade, disease control, environmental issues and criminal justice. But cooperation is not the same thing as subordination.

International organisations should serve sovereign nations—not govern them.

Perhaps no recent statement captures the growing concern better than that of US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who recently condemned the ICC and pledged that the United States would use every available means to oppose what he described as the Court's encroachment on national sovereignty. Rubio argued that no unelected international tribunal should possess the authority to prosecute citizens of countries that have never consented to its jurisdiction and vowed to work towards disabling the Court's ability to operate in its current form. Recent reports indicate that the Trump administration has begun a concerted diplomatic campaign against the ICC and has imposed sanctions on ICC officials involved in investigations targeting the United States and its allies. (Reuters)

Whether one agrees with Rubio or not, he has raised an important question that every democracy should be asking:

Who governs the governors?

If the answer is "no one", then we should all be concerned.

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Here is Marco Rubio's recent speech on the ICC

Time To Finish The Job

Only weeks ago, the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran was hailed by some as the first step towards de-escalation. Others, including this blog, warned that it rested on wishful thinking rather than any genuine change in the Iranian regime's behaviour.

Sadly, events have proved those concerns well founded.

Rather than embracing peace, Iran has continued to challenge international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, renewed attacks against its neighbours through its proxies, issued fresh threats against both President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, demanded reparations from the United States, and even asserted that it should control the Strait of Hormuz and charge transit fees for vessels passing through one of the world's most important waterways.

This is not the conduct of a government seeking reconciliation.

It is the conduct of a regime that believes it can act with increasing boldness without paying a meaningful price.

Empty Threats Encourage Aggression

President Trump has repeatedly warned Iran that further aggression would bring severe consequences.

Yet those consequences have largely failed to materialise.

Instead, the American response has become increasingly piecemeal—limited retaliatory strikes here, stern warnings there, followed by another Iranian provocation.

This pattern is dangerous.

History demonstrates that authoritarian regimes often interpret restraint not as goodwill, but as weakness. Every threat that is not followed by decisive action risks reducing the credibility of the next one.

Whether fairly or unfairly, Tehran now appears to believe that domestic political pressures will prevent the United States from taking the stronger measures it once threatened.

If that is indeed Iran's calculation, recent events suggest it has become increasingly confident.

Before the MOU, the Strategy Was Working

Ironically, the strategy that appeared to have the greatest effect on Iran was the one employed before negotiations resumed.

Maximum economic pressure dramatically reduced Iran's oil exports, constrained its finances, and limited its ability to fund regional proxies and military adventures.

The subsequent shift towards negotiation has not produced moderation. Instead, Iran has continued to test the limits of Western resolve while seeking concessions at every opportunity.

Negotiations only succeed when both sides believe the alternative is worse.

At present, there is little evidence that Tehran fears the alternative.

A Different Strategy

If the objective is lasting stability rather than temporary headlines, the United States should return to a policy of sustained pressure.

That could include:

• Reimposing the full sanctions regime.

• Re-establishing the strongest possible restrictions on Iranian oil exports.

• Suspending negotiations until Iran demonstrates genuine compliance rather than making further demands.

• Continuing to destroy military assets that attack commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.

• Using frozen Iranian assets, where legally authorised, to compensate regional states that have suffered losses from Iranian-sponsored attacks.

If maintaining a comprehensive maritime blockade proves difficult, another option would be to substantially degrade Iran's principal oil export infrastructure, particularly facilities on Kharg Island. Temporarily removing Iran's ability to export oil would dramatically reduce the regime's revenue and its capacity to finance military operations.

Such actions would undoubtedly carry economic and political costs. Energy markets would react, and there would be domestic political consequences in the United States.

However, maintaining the present approach also carries costs.

An ineffective deterrent invites further escalation.

Credibility Matters

International diplomacy depends on credibility.

Threats only deter if they are believed.

Repeated warnings followed by limited responses risk creating the opposite effect—they encourage adversaries to continue probing for weakness.

If President Trump believes stronger action is justified, he should take it.

If he does not, then the repeated public threats should stop.

The current approach risks achieving the worst of both worlds: escalating Iranian aggression while steadily eroding American credibility.

Time Is Running Short

The administration still has an opportunity to reverse course.

Applying sustained economic and military pressure consistently—not intermittently—would force Tehran to confront the reality that continued confrontation carries unbearable costs. Economic pressure has influenced Iranian decision-making before, and it may do so again.

Whether such a strategy would succeed cannot be known with certainty. But what seems increasingly clear is that the current strategy is failing.

There comes a point when every negotiation must be judged not by the promises made when it was signed, but by the behaviour that follows.

By that measure, the so-called peace deal has failed.

It is time to stop managing the crisis and start resolving it.

Weekly Roundup - Top Articles and Commentary from Week 29 of 2026

  

Here are links to some selected articles of interest and our posts from this week.

• Without Hezbollah’s Disarmament There Is No Peace
• Gazans Are Protesting Hamas. Why Isn't It Headline News?
• Has Multiculturalism Lost Its Way?
• Time To Finish The Job
• Sovereignty Under Siege
• The Anti-Israel Industry

Cartoon of the Day

We welcome all feedback; please feel free to submit your comments or contact me via email at grappysb@gmail.com or on X at @grappysb

Has Multiculturalism Lost Its Way?

 For most of human history, migration has been one of civilisation's great success stories.

People moved in search of safety, freedom and opportunity. They brought with them new skills, traditions and ideas. Over time they became part of their adopted countries while retaining pride in their heritage. Italians became Australian. Indians became British. Hungarians became American. Their grandchildren often thought of themselves simply as Australians, Britons or Americans with an interesting family history.

Immigration enriched nations because integration worked.

So why has the debate become so bitter?

The answer, I believe, lies not in immigration itself, but in the scale, speed and philosophy that have accompanied it over the past two decades.

The Difference Between Immigration and Multiculturalism

These terms are often treated as though they mean the same thing. They don't.

Immigration is simply the movement of people.

Multiculturalism is a political philosophy about how those different cultures should coexist.

Historically, Western countries expected newcomers to integrate into the national culture. They learned the language, accepted the laws and institutions, and gradually adopted the values that defined their new home. They could celebrate Chinese New Year, Diwali or Easter while still sharing a common civic identity.

Today's multicultural model often sends a different message.

Rather than encouraging integration into a shared national culture, it increasingly emphasises preserving distinct cultural identities, with governments recognising, funding and sometimes negotiating separately with different communities.

Instead of one national conversation, society risks becoming many parallel conversations.

Numbers Matter

Migration has never been purely about percentages.

A family moving into a suburb naturally adapts to the existing community.

A thousand families moving together are able to recreate much of the society they left behind.

That is not a criticism; it is simply human nature.

Small migrant communities tend to integrate more readily because interaction with the wider community is unavoidable.

Very large communities can become largely self-contained. Schools, businesses, media, places of worship and social lives increasingly revolve around the community itself. Integration becomes slower, and sometimes optional.

At the same time, long-established residents often find rapid demographic change unsettling. Whether those concerns are justified or not, they are real. When change happens faster than people can comfortably absorb it, social trust can weaken.

Politics Makes the Problem Worse

Large communities also represent significant voting blocs.

Political parties inevitably begin tailoring policies and messages to particular communities rather than appealing to the nation as a whole.

Identity politics flourishes.

Instead of asking, "What is good for Australia?", politicians increasingly ask, "What will this community think?"

The result is predictable.

Citizens begin seeing themselves not simply as Australians, Britons or Americans, but as members of competing cultural constituencies.

That is a dangerous direction for any democracy.

Europe and Britain Offer Warnings

Across much of Europe, immigration has become one of the defining political issues of our time.

Parties advocating stricter immigration controls have gained support in countries including France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Sweden as voters express concerns about integration, housing pressures, crime, and national identity.

Britain provides another example of growing cultural division.

Large pro-Palestinian demonstrations have regularly filled London's streets since the Hamas attacks of October 2023, while counter-protests have emerged from groups concerned about national identity and social cohesion. These competing demonstrations have become symbols of a broader debate over what it means to be British in an increasingly diverse society.

Whether one agrees with either side is beside the point.

The fact that these divisions have become so visible should concern us all.

Australia's Debate

Australia is now confronting the same questions.

Pauline Hanson reignited national debate by arguing that Australia should aspire to be "multiracial but monocultural"—a phrase that immediately generated confusion because people attached very different meanings to the word "monoculture."

Many critics interpreted the term as implying cultural uniformity or rejection of diversity.

Supporters argued that what Hanson was really describing was a society united by common values, laws and civic identity while remaining ethnically diverse.

The terminology obscured the underlying issue.

Konstantin Kisin Explains It Better

One of the clearest explanations comes not from politicians but from British commentator Konstantin Kisin.

He distinguishes between a country made up of many ethnic backgrounds and a country united by one set of civic values.

People may eat different foods, celebrate different festivals and come from every corner of the globe.

But they should still share a commitment to democracy, equality before the law, freedom of speech, religious liberty, and loyalty to the nation that welcomed them.

That is not ethnic conformity.

It is civic unity.

It is also very close to what many Australians understood multiculturalism to mean when the policy was first introduced.

Diversity Needs a Centre

The debate is often presented as a choice between diversity and intolerance.

That is a false choice.

Successful societies can be wonderfully diverse.

But diversity needs a centre of gravity.

Every successful nation requires a common language, shared institutions, mutual obligations and a widely accepted understanding of the rules by which everyone lives.

Without that shared foundation, diversity gradually becomes fragmentation.

People begin living beside one another rather than together.

Rebuilding Social Cohesion

If we want a cohesive society, then the answer is not to abandon immigration. Australia has been enriched by generations of migrants, and there is every reason to believe that it will continue to be.

What needs to change is the framework within which immigration occurs.

Governments should place renewed emphasis on integration rather than separation. Every child should leave school with a strong understanding of Australia's history, democratic institutions and civic values. English should remain the common language of public life, and every new migrant should be encouraged and supported to become proficient in it, because a shared language is the foundation of mutual understanding.

Government should also resist the temptation to divide Australians into competing communities. Public funding should be based on need and benefit to the whole community, not on ethnicity, religion or cultural background. The law should apply equally to every citizen, and public policy should reinforce the principle that Australians are treated as individuals rather than members of competing identity groups.

Equally important is restoring a sense of national pride. New citizens should be encouraged to embrace not only the opportunities Australia offers, but also the responsibilities of citizenship. Celebrating one's heritage and embracing an Australian identity are not contradictory—they are complementary. The overwhelming success of earlier waves of migration demonstrates that people can honour their family traditions while proudly calling themselves Australian.

Finally, governments must recognise that the pace of migration matters as much as the numbers themselves. Communities need time to absorb new arrivals, schools and infrastructure need time to adapt, and newcomers need the opportunity to integrate into the broader society. Immigration levels should be set not only by economic demand but also by the nation's capacity to successfully integrate those who arrive.

Australia's strength has never been its ethnic uniformity. It has been its ability to bring together people from every corner of the globe under a shared commitment to democracy, freedom, equality before the law and mutual respect.

That is the real Australian model worth preserving.

It is not a monoculture in the sense of everyone looking the same, worshipping the same way or abandoning their heritage. It is a common civic culture—a nation of many backgrounds united by one set of values. If we can rediscover that principle, Australia can continue to enjoy the benefits of immigration without sacrificing the social cohesion that has made it one of the world's most successful societies.