Only weeks ago, the memorandum of understanding between the United States and Iran was hailed by some as the first step towards de-escalation. Others, including this blog, warned that it rested on wishful thinking rather than any genuine change in the Iranian regime's behaviour.
Sadly, events have proved those concerns well founded.
Rather than embracing peace, Iran has continued to challenge international shipping through the Strait of Hormuz, renewed attacks against its neighbours through its proxies, issued fresh threats against both President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, demanded reparations from the United States, and even asserted that it should control the Strait of Hormuz and charge transit fees for vessels passing through one of the world's most important waterways.
This is not the conduct of a government seeking reconciliation.
It is the conduct of a regime that believes it can act with increasing boldness without paying a meaningful price.
Empty Threats Encourage Aggression
President Trump has repeatedly warned Iran that further aggression would bring severe consequences.
Yet those consequences have largely failed to materialise.
Instead, the American response has become increasingly piecemeal—limited retaliatory strikes here, stern warnings there, followed by another Iranian provocation.
This pattern is dangerous.
History demonstrates that authoritarian regimes often interpret restraint not as goodwill, but as weakness. Every threat that is not followed by decisive action risks reducing the credibility of the next one.
Whether fairly or unfairly, Tehran now appears to believe that domestic political pressures will prevent the United States from taking the stronger measures it once threatened.
If that is indeed Iran's calculation, recent events suggest it has become increasingly confident.
Before the MOU, the Strategy Was Working
Ironically, the strategy that appeared to have the greatest effect on Iran was the one employed before negotiations resumed.
Maximum economic pressure dramatically reduced Iran's oil exports, constrained its finances, and limited its ability to fund regional proxies and military adventures.
The subsequent shift towards negotiation has not produced moderation. Instead, Iran has continued to test the limits of Western resolve while seeking concessions at every opportunity.
Negotiations only succeed when both sides believe the alternative is worse.
At present, there is little evidence that Tehran fears the alternative.
A Different Strategy
If the objective is lasting stability rather than temporary headlines, the United States should return to a policy of sustained pressure.
That could include:
Reimposing the full sanctions regime.
Re-establishing the strongest possible restrictions on Iranian oil exports.
Suspending negotiations until Iran demonstrates genuine compliance rather than making further demands.
Continuing to destroy military assets that attack commercial shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
Using frozen Iranian assets, where legally authorised, to compensate regional states that have suffered losses from Iranian-sponsored attacks.
If maintaining a comprehensive maritime blockade proves difficult, another option would be to substantially degrade Iran's principal oil export infrastructure, particularly facilities on Kharg Island. Temporarily removing Iran's ability to export oil would dramatically reduce the regime's revenue and its capacity to finance military operations.
Such actions would undoubtedly carry economic and political costs. Energy markets would react, and there would be domestic political consequences in the United States.
However, maintaining the present approach also carries costs.
An ineffective deterrent invites further escalation.
Credibility Matters
International diplomacy depends on credibility.
Threats only deter if they are believed.
Repeated warnings followed by limited responses risk creating the opposite effect—they encourage adversaries to continue probing for weakness.
If President Trump believes stronger action is justified, he should take it.
If he does not, then the repeated public threats should stop.
The current approach risks achieving the worst of both worlds: escalating Iranian aggression while steadily eroding American credibility.
Time Is Running Short
The administration still has an opportunity to reverse course.
Applying sustained economic and military pressure consistently—not intermittently—would force Tehran to confront the reality that continued confrontation carries unbearable costs. Economic pressure has influenced Iranian decision-making before, and it may do so again.
Whether such a strategy would succeed cannot be known with certainty. But what seems increasingly clear is that the current strategy is failing.
There comes a point when every negotiation must be judged not by the promises made when it was signed, but by the behaviour that follows.
By that measure, the so-called peace deal has failed.
It is time to stop managing the crisis and start resolving it.
